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Neurothics has far greater responsibilities than merely noting potential human
enhancements arriving from novel brain-centered biotechnologies and tracking their
implications for ethics and civic life. Neuroethics must utilize the best cognitive and
neuroscientific knowledge to shape incisive discussions about what could possibly count
as enhancement in the first place, and what should count as genuinely “cognitive”
enhancement. Where cognitive processing and the mental life is concerned, the lived
context of psychological performance is paramount. Starting with an enhancement to
the mental abilities of an individual, only performances on real-world exercises can
determine what has actually been cognitively improved. And what can concretely counts
as some specific sort of cognitive improvement is largely determined by the classificatory
frameworks of cultures, not brain scans or laboratory experiments. Additionally, where
the public must ultimately evaluate and judge the worthiness of individual performance
enhancements, we mustn’t presume that public approval towards enhancers will
somehow automatically arrive without due regard to civic ideals such as the common
good or social justice. In the absence of any nuanced appreciation for the control which
performance contexts and public contexts exert over what “cognitive” enhancements
could actually be, enthusiastic promoters of cognitive enhancement can all too easily
depict safe and effective brain modifications as surely good for us and for society. These
enthusiasts are not unaware of oft-heard observations about serious hurdles for reliable
enhancement from neurophysiological modifications. Yet those observations are far more
common than penetrating investigations into the implications to those hurdles for a
sound public understanding of cognitive enhancement, and a wise policy review over
cognitive enhancement. We offer some crucial recommendations for undertaking such
investigations, so that cognitive enhancers that truly deserve public approval can be better
identified.
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In its disciplinary stance and practice, neuroethics acknowledges
the most sufficiently confirmed theories of the neural and cogni-
tive sciences as (provisionally) accurate in an overriding manner.
Indeed, neuroethics should not ignore or set aside such theories
if/when these prove to be inconvenient for, or incompatible with,
practical applications, principled values, private intuitions, or
popular common sense. Nor should these theories be muted when
neuroethical engagement of real-world issues, questions and
problems are needed. The actual functions of the brain, as best as
can be described at present, is—and must remain—fundamental
to any and all neuroethical discourse and deliberations.
In light of this, we argue that neuroethical inquiries into
cognitive enhancement should establish the crucial role for
context, especially socio-cultural contexts to conceptions of the
“cognitive”, so as to better define the realities of neuroethical
debates about cognitive performance enhancement (and
enhancers). We write in support of investigations into putative
neuro-enhancers which adopt the theoretical stance that
hoped-for improvements cannot be evaluated in isolation from
human activities that provide the meaningful context to any
alteration in performance. At key points of our argument we
appeal to empirical studies examining performance alterations,
to exemplify our concern for due attentiveness to real-world
situational conduct as possible enhancers are tested and
utilized. Where relevant contexts to neuroscientific inquiry and
information utilized for normative purposes are taken seriously,
the work of formulating and guiding neuroethical quandaries
would be appreciably strengthened.
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With our argument for this role of context established, we then
outline crucial policy considerations regarding neuro-cognitive
enhancement, and raise some warnings about over-eager advo-
cacy for enhancement. While remaining cautiously optimistic
toward opportunities for cognitive enhancement, we insist upon
fostering public understanding of the issues, and upon develop-
ment of sound public policy. In this way we join the ranks of other
neuroethicists who have voiced similar views and concerns (Illes
and Bird, 2006; Levy, 2011; Farah, 2012; Gunson, 2012; Fitz et al.,
2014; Maslen et al., 2014b; Racine et al., 2014).
As a discipline and set of practices, neuroethics must utilize
the best cognitive and neuroscientific knowledge to shape incisive
discussions about what could possibly count as enhancement
in the first place, and what should count as genuinely “cogni-
tive” enhancement. Where cognitive processing and mental life
is concerned, the lived context of psychological performance is
paramount. In the absence of any nuanced appreciation for the
control which performance contexts and public contexts exert
over what “cognitive” enhancement could actually be, enthusiastic
promoters of cognitive enhancement can all too easily depict
brain modifications as being good for individuals and for society.
Such claims are not unaware of serious hurdles—hurdles noted in
oft-heard observations and express concerns—that may impede
enhancement derived from neurophysiological modifications. Yet
those observations are far more common than penetrating inves-
tigations into the implications that such hurdles may evoke—both
for the sound public understanding of cognitive enhancement,
and for wisely informing policy to guide and govern cognitive
enhancement. To wit, we offer what we maintain to be crucial rec-
ommendations for undertaking such investigations, so as to better
identify cognitive enhancers that truly deserve public approval
and policy support.
Civics and general ethics can be idealistic, but neuroethics
should not be unrealistic, and must be liberated from ethical
theorizing done in ignorance of the most contemporary under-
standing of the structure and function of the brain. In this way,
neuroethics must strive to comprehend the genuine basis of
conceptions of self, society, and morality, and rely on changes or
replacements to those conceptions when and where scientifically
warranted (Shook and Giordano, 2014).
ENHANCEMENT STANDARDS
Bioethicist Thomas Murray identifies two primary meanings to
the term “enhancement”: first, “to advance, augment, elevate,
heighten, increase”; and second, “to increase the worth or value
of.” (Murray, 2007) In both definitions, context is axiomatic.
Numerous scholars have similarly noted the “metric” and “nor-
mative” dimensions of this term. For an organism such as a
human being, enhancement implies opportunities to improve
capacities or abilities—features that can be simultaneously mea-
surable and valuable, and possibly moral, as well. Structure and
function cooperate and even interfuse, even as they have distinct
implications for ethicality, and this can confuse discussions of
enhancement, in general, and of “cognitive enhancement” more
specifically.
Hence, it is important to ask whether a particular modifica-
tion is responsible for altered performance of a specified task.
If it is, then that physiological modification is a performance
modifier, and if that change is regarded as positive relative to
some normative standard, then we can refer to it as a perfor-
mance improver. Furthermore, if we call a particular activity an
“intellectual” task, then we are really talking about an intellectual
enhancement for performing that task. This physiological mod-
ification may be labeled as an “intellectual enhancement” in an
easy, colloquial manner of speaking, although at this point in the
description, a scientific understanding of the brain or intellectual
capacities is not yet involved.
In light of that science, however, it can no longer be enough
to simply track cognitive functions and the resulting perfor-
mance on particular tasks to verify enhancers. An alteration to a
physiological process associated with cognition can be measured
and compared against some organic standard. Has enhancement
occurred? It is still too soon to say; a pre-set physiological standard
is never simply a “given” normative standard. Detecting a phys-
iological alteration within an individual requires an individual-
relative standard against which to measure that alteration, to
be sure. But what may be expected from one person needn’t
expected from others. Setting someone’s neurological functioning
as the standard for any human brain’s “normal” functioning, so
that a baseline for cognitive functioning can be established in
preparation for detecting cognitive improvement done to any-
one, is quite another normative decision. One that normality
standard is put in place, then actual cognitive function (for
the processing and integration of various types of sensations,
memories, emotions, subconscious valuations, and so on) can
be estimated and compared against some standard of normality.
Even after this has been done, it still may be premature to say
whether or not the evoked changes represent an enhancement;
reliable cognitive performance (for one’s overall management of
life activities and achievements) must be judged in light of some
ethical standard. Just as human-normal performance can’t be
reduced to any single individual’s functioning, ethically responsi-
ble enhancement cannot be reduced to any superiority over what
has been conventionally set as generically normal for “average”
humans.
Standards at the three levels of individual physiology,
human-generic normality, and sensible ethicality all compete for
prominence where definitions of “enhancement” are concerned.
Furthermore, it doesn’t help that the complexities of the ner-
vous system can permit odd scenarios in which an increase in
physiological function(s) might diminish cognitive ability; and
diminishing a specific type of cognitive function might be con-
ducive to optimizing a person’s actions or general well-being
(Earp et al., 2014). Rigidly demanding only one standard, or
one direction by that standard, with which to dictate enhance-
ment is a stubborn path to take, and one that we assert any
rational approach to neuroethical analysis and discourse should
avoid.
Letting the concept or term “enhancement” stand for any non-
therapeutic benefits conferred by an intervention is a common
way to avoid taking any (if not all three) standards seriously. Does
enhancement begin when a medical treatment exceeds the usual
dosage or typical extent of repair? Perhaps enhancement refers to
those instances where treatment yields physiological functioning
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beyond the normal range. Or, enhancement might entail evok-
ing superior performance that lends distinct advantages to life.
Arguing over these options overlooks the mistake that enhance-
ment can begin where therapy ends. It is a mistake that is easy to
make.
Therapeutic medicine simplifies its standards because it takes
all of humanity to be its proper field of work; a good treatment
for a health deficiency generically helps any patient suffering from
that problem. So long as the reference class remains “humanity,”
then a physiological “average” functioning can be equated with
generic normality, and there would only be “disease treatments”
(aiming towards normality) and “enhancement treatments” (aim-
ing beyond normality). However, patients aren’t so generic in the
real world. Broad culture and local society are contexts that always
exert influence.
For example, what can count as normality and abnormality
within a particular culture might not obtain for all of humanity
too. But, if that culture’s influence (viz.—power) is sufficiently
strong, clinicians, patients, publics and governing bodies might
not necessarily notice, or care (or feel empowered to act even
if they did). Furthermore, any social group within that cul-
ture could come to regard itself as the proper reference class,
expressly if that group enjoys some status and/or privilege. When
that social group requests medical treatment, it is set in terms
of what counts as “group normal” rather than just “culturally
normal” or “normal for humanity.” For example, when middle-
aged privileged men take their reference class as “adult men
like us”, they surely aren’t thinking about “all human males on
the planet between the ages of 18 and 80.” Nor are they taking
their reference class to be people very much like them, such as
“successful men between 45 and 65.” Instead, what counts as
“normality” is the reference class that these men desire to be,
perhaps something like “healthy guys in their 30s-50s.” So, in
effect they want what counts as “subgroup optimal.” Growing
approval among a subgroup about using a drug or device off-label
lends credence towards that intervention’s status as an “enhancer”,
even if that subgroup expects more than just intellectual per-
formance (Hildt et al., 2014; Wade et al., 2014). Interventions
can transition from enhancers back to treatments, as well. If a
culture’s medicine proves willing, then treatment for achieving
subgroup optimality could be labeled as medical “therapy”, rather
than enhancement.
Neuroethics must take close notice of: (1) the kinds of
standards applied for determining enhancement; (2) the chosen
reference class serving as the background against which enhance-
ment would stand out; and (3) the selection of “normality” or
“optimality” as the envisioned goal to enhancement. Medicine’s
traditional focus on generic remedies for universal application to
all humanity is not the best (or perhaps even a viable) framework
for identifying and classifying enhancements. Cultural inher-
itance, group socialization, personal values, and physiological
factors are each and all necessarily involved when defining and
addressing enhancement. The advent of “personalized” medicine
aiming towards the individualization of diagnostics and treat-
ments should raise awareness across neuroethics that specifics will
matter to ever greater degrees in the future.
ENHANCING COGNITION IN CONTEXT
The temptation to regard cognition as an entirely neurophys-
iological matter, amenable to objective study, definition, and
measurement, isn’t just a symptom of overreaching reduction-
ism or scientism. Frustration with too much context can set
in for anyone reconciled to cognition’s reliance on brain func-
tioning. If cognition is, in some sense, objectively present as
subjects undergo experimental study, then it could be objectively
modified. Researchers would be able to determine when and
how cognition is improved when compared against some pre-
set standard of cognitive ability. Serious attention to cognitive
enhancement came to the fore as a consequence of experimental
facilitation of cognitive ability, with due caution leveraged against
exaggerated claims of capability, meaning and utility. (Metzinger
and Hildt, 2011; Sahakian and Morein-Zamir, 2011; Sandberg,
2011; Chatterjee, 2013; Cohen Kadosh, 2013; Hildt and Franke,
2013). Hard lessons learned from pharmaceutical studies apply to
any sort of performance effects produced by alteration of brain
structure and function (Luber, 2014).
Neuroethical attention must be paid to wider contexts of
neurological manipulation, beyond the fairly objective and nar-
row ways that cognitive performances can be adjusted in desired
directions. Determining if a neurological intervention can actu-
ally produce a desired enhancement is one thing; ascertaining
that some sort of adjustment is truly cognitive (in the expected
manner) is quite another, and these distinctions deserve prior-
ity. Imitating medicine’s quest for therapies that have universal
utility for anyone suffering from a generic health problem is no
longer a wise undertaking for the application of 21st century
biomedical advancements. As well, we maintain that it is equally
unwise to promote enhancements as if they could be univer-
sally beneficial for generic cognitive improvements to anyone’s
intellectual performances. Indeed, we argue that there may not
be such a thing as a “generic enhancement to cognitive per-
formance.” A major reason for this involves cultural contexts.
Two people from two different cultures, or even two people
from two subgroups of the same culture, may not necessarily
agree on what is cognitively adjusted by some alteration of neu-
rological function. Thus, neuroethical inquiry cannot avoid an
interpretative circle: some group of people ascribe a “function”
to a cognitive process in service of a task that is considered to
be “normal”—but this is a social imposition of normality on a
neurophysiological process. In this way, performance, not neuro-
physiology in isolation, decides functionality, and what counts as
“normal”.
For illustration, consider an analogy: suppose a practical
way to increase muscle mass (without deleterious side effects)
is offered as a general “athletic enhancer” that could be used
by anyone. Athleticism depends on one’s musculature, surely,
so given this rationalization, more muscle should enable more
athleticism. But muscle mass alone does not equate with athletic
ability (or in some cases even potential ability!) For example, one
can take anabolic-androgenic steroids (AAS) to augment muscle
mass. As matter of fact, these very likely will lend something of
an “edge” to (important) dispositions and characteristics neces-
sary for improved athletic performance (i.e.,—muscle size and
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strength; Llewellyn, 2010). However, the underlying premise is
that the agent is increasing specific qualities of muscle (e.g.,—
diameter of muscle fibers, contractile force, etc.) that have been
shown to be operative in a number of athletic events.
Herein though, are important caveats. While an AAS may yield
mass and strength gains, these are only preparatory for “training
effects”, because an athlete must still train for a particular sport.
AAS can facilitate that training, but if training is conducted
improperly, less success at a sport is a likely result. Furthermore,
different physiological agents can elicit distinct effects. Some will
enable gains in muscle mass but not necessarily facilitate defini-
tion; others will be more lipolytic, and produce lean, muscular
density, but will not greatly increase mass, and so forth. Also,
AAS does little for aerobic endurance per se, just as an endurance-
facilitating agent (such as erythropoietin, EPO) does little for
mass or strength. (consult Llewellyn, 2010). The adage is: The
right agent for the right effect.
These points account for the ample evidence—and practical
wisdom—indicating that if one wants to become proficient in
a particular sport, then it is necessary to vigorously train in
that sport. There are generic athletic training exercises, but each
sport must evaluate their utility. For example, cross training
can lend overall benefits to components of athleticism, but it
doesn’t necessarily permit direct performance gains peculiar to
each sport. Only after specific kinds of athletic performances,
and the individual athletes performing them, are identified and
targeted, would an intervention be intelligently developed and
employed to exert positive effect(s) within selected contexts.
Expanding upon this example of sports performance, we may
expect that most types of neurological interventions intended for
the enhancement of performances displaying much complexity
may only work best in conjunction with cognitive training reg-
imens. Not only must any trials confirming a modification for
cognitive improvement involve successful routine practice under
controlled conditions, only implementing that modification in
conjunction with strenuous performance training result in the
practical enhancements to performances actually valued outside
of any laboratory.
More generally, it is naïve to suppose that a compensatory
adjustment, much less an enhancing adjustment, could be gener-
ically assigned validity across all of humanity. Even best-case
scenarios must remain stubbornly diffuse. Calling a performance
test a “cognitive performance test” and observing that individuals
who are subjected to intervention “x” perform better doesn’t
mean that some purely cognitive functioning has been isolated
and targeted as the improved factor. Fortunately, careful research
is hardly so naïve, as recent exemplars have noted (Pringle et al.,
2013). The lesson is that no one pondering cognitive enhance-
ment should assume that higher cognition can occur in some
“pure” forms, no matter how specific the task. To begin with,
multiple affective and motor processes are interfused with the
functional components that are operative in executive control.
In turn, executive control is interfused with every sophisticated
practice acquired during childhood and adolescence. This is
especially the case when dealing with higher cognition manifest-
ing in social and moral behaviors (Shook, 2012; Specker et al.,
2014).
Enculturalization takes advantage of advanced executive con-
trol for instilling specialized task performances, such as learning
mathematics and logic. It is no paradox that the more cogni-
tively abstract the task, the more it has a cultural rather than a
purely biological basis; hence such tasks are very much subject
to the vagaries of cultural history and practice. Something as
simple as conceptualizing number and amount has been shown
to be culturally variant (Núñez, 2011). Similarly, memory perfor-
mance has been shown to be culture-dependent and -influenced
(Gutchess et al., 2011; Hewer and Roberts, 2012). Cultures con-
tribute to cognition as much as cognition contributes to culture
(Han and Pöppel, 2011; Ishii, 2013; Kim and Sasaki, 2014). Even
context is contextual as far as cognition is concerned, since the
developing sensitivity towards, and responsiveness to, environing
interpersonal context displays cultural variability (Imada et al.,
2013).
The contextual factors raised here are not posed to endorse a
thorough relativism or dismissive eliminativism about potential
enhancers. Cognitive enhancement can be quite real, when and
where it is created. To be sure, confirmable cognitive enhance-
ments can be achieved because improved cognitive (i.e.,—
intellectual and/or emotional) performances by selected and
trained participants can be measured under controlled condi-
tions. Generally speaking, under sufficiently similar conditions,
similarly altered people having enough in common will perform
similarly, all other things being equal. What more could be
expected from science?
ENHANCEMENT IN PUBLIC CONTEXTS
Desires to “improve the human condition” conjure proposals for a
proverbial “rising tide” of neuroscientific and neurotechnological
modifications that will “raise all boats”—and brains. But when
realistically looking ahead, unavoidable questions loom: How
much can humans be enhanced without deforming or destroying
aspects of the social or natural world on which life relies? and,
Will human character and moral progress be sustained if hopes
for enhancement become realized? Some have supported a duty
to urge enhancers and even intervene with required enhancement,
once we can apply a safe and effective intervention. However,
our comprehension of long-term consequences is limited, and
encouraging (what may be long-lasting) modifications without
ensuring equally durable individual welfare is reckless (Rossi et al.,
2013).
Shall the position of the responsible individual prevail instead?
Letting individuals choose for themselves is no less reckless. Even
when individual benefits can be guaranteed, it must be asked:
who should receive them? The answer, “All who can benefit,” is
no answer at all, because it will not be the case that everyone will
have the same, or even similar, access at the same time. Differential
access is inevitable in a world of finite time and resources. Such
differential access is prima facie unjust, as those who already
possess certain traits, attributes, and/or resources will likely and
quickly get even more. Hence, essential concerns for distributive
justice arise from the position of society at large. The distribution
of improved health and lifestyle status, and even improved moral
status, will always be a social concern (Buchanan, 2011; Douglas,
2013).
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Worries over distribution cannot—nor should not—be easily
dispelled. Those with the least assets are those most unlikely to
get access to state-of-the-art scientific and technological interven-
tions. It is unrealistic to assume that some massive shift in the
social architectonics of medical resource allocation will occur so
as to allow neuroscience and neurotechnology to close the gap
between those who “have” and those who “have not.” Given this
reality, does everyone really want a society where the people get-
ting the most enhancement(s) are precisely those enjoying great
wealth? The prospect of cognitive enhancement surely highlights
this worry: intelligence does what character directs, and the kinds
of characters getting so wealthy in a society may not be the
people to be trusted with even more intelligence—and power.
Proponents of unlimited access to enhancement simply point the
way toward an unbalanced distributive scheme. Contests between
rival distribution methods can be debated in ethics, but they get
adjudicated in politics.
Hence, entering the realm of politics becomes unavoidable.
The politics surrounding access to enhancement will be intense.
Of equal importance is the temptation to use brain science within
agendas of political power to control fundamentally biological
aspects of individuals’ and communities’ existence (invoking what
Foucault referred to as biopolitics; see Foucault, 2008; Anderson
et al., 2012). Bioethical and neuroethical analyses cannot avoid
addressing science as a public good; ethics as a search for the
good and the right; and politics as the participation of citizens
in decisions about the guidance of public order. As public debate
over the impact(s) of enhancement interventions accelerates, the
search for principled guidelines has ensued, and neuroethics has
become ever more involved (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009).
Irrespective of whether enhancement is regarded as a boun-
tiful cornucopia or a ticking bomb, the differing contexts of
enhancement radically transform its biopolitical status. Recall
from a previous section our attention to the choice among
physiology, normality, and ethical standards for identifying what
counts as enhancement. Experimental medical research focusing
upon physiological alterations (typically) emphasizes interven-
tions for those who are the most unhealthy. Policy tends to
approve funding for basic research if and when it could soon
help those with the most severe, and/or epidemiologically exten-
sive, health conditions. These prioritizations wouldn’t work in
the realm of enhancement for three reasons. First, a traditional
approach to funding and engaging research would tend to leave
most enhancements on the theoretical drawing board. Second,
while there may be desires for expensive advanced research into
fundamental neurological mechanisms that can be targeted for
cognitive performance enhancement, unless these approaches
can be ascribed to incur some “therapeutic” benefit against an
identified disease, disorder or (medical) condition, financial and
administrative support for broad scale research and translation
of outcomes and products would tend to be lacking. Third,
while there may be a viable—and perhaps growing—market for
certain cognitive performance enhancements, it is difficult to
generate the funding necessary to support and sustain exploratory
research required for translation to safe commercial technolo-
gies (unless developed and marketed as “non-medical” prod-
ucts such as toys and games, which then raises the specter of
inapt and/or unsound development, distribution and use; see, for
example, Giordano and DuRousseau, 2011; and Plischke et al.,
2011).
A related issue is the contemporary medical endorsement of
interventions that restore or sustain “normality.” Explicitly and
implicitly this position conforms to socio-cultural requirements
that all people should seek and exhibit “normal” functioning,
rather than (what is regarded to be) abnormal or anti-social
conduct that deviates from socially established standards. What
posture should be assumed when (a) certain people seek optimal
functioning in pursuit of what they personally deem as the apex
of the good life, and/or (b) society sets requirements that indi-
viduals in special roles (such as physicians, pilots, peace officers,
or warfighters) must attain some level of optimal functioning?
(Giordano et al., 2013; Goold and Maslen, 2014) Medicine’s
laudable work in service of living a good life isn’t automat-
ically extendable to living a great life, or to achieving great
performance in a socially-sanctioned service. Justifications for
specialized enhancements for enabling idiosyncratic lifestyles or
for extraordinary public service will not necessarily be obtained
in and from medical principles.
A second set of examples arise from our earlier discussion
of the cultural relativism inherent to the precise identification
of cognitive improvements. Medicine’s due caution with clinical
application, watching carefully for deleterious health and lifestyle
side-effects, relies upon cultural consensus about what constitutes
“normal” performance in daily life (Gini et al., 2010). Those
seeking significant enhancements, by contrast, won’t be inter-
ested in conforming to cultural norms about ordinary perfor-
mance, and medicine may not be able to restrain them. When
the recipient of an enhancement is achieving extraordinary per-
formance levels and feeling empowered to transgress cultural
expectations in the name of greatness (despite the risks), what
social institution or cultural tradition can and will reign-in their
pursuits?
Evidently, society turns to law for such proscriptions. Yet, here
it becomes necessary to ask how restrictions of, and prohibitions
against certain types and extents of enhancement will be
determined. Targeting concrete neurological modifications
for legal bans (i.e.,—imitating medical bans of performance
enhancing substances for professional athletes, and/or scheduling
certain drugs) has the merit of objective verification. But this only
spurs those seeking improved types of cognitive performance
to find alternative physiological methods not yet banned or
detectable, and the chase is begun anew.
POLICY PRIORITIES AND THE ROLE OF NEUROETHICS
Frustration over excessive contextualization is a perennial com-
plaint. Simplifying matters can seem attractive when modest
advances require prompt address and short-term priorities are
within reach. Simplification would be possible if the construct and
term “enhancement” satisfied defined and pragmatic scientific
and ethical criteria. That way, any continued debate would be cen-
tered on those improvements that were already deemed to be fairly
good for people in general, so far as could be scientifically and
ethically determined. Warnings are certainly in order that current
enhancement interventions rarely prove to be wholly effective
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or without deleterious effects. Unsurprisingly, wide agreement
among scientific, ethics, and policy communities can be found
on the view that enhancing interventions shouldn’t be counter-
productive or harmful to overall health.
However, we posit that practical risk-benefit analyses aren’t
entirely sufficient. Detailed ethical scrutiny is required before any
such practical improvements can be classified as good enhancers.
It is wise to demand that putatively enhancing interventions do
not diminish self-control or autonomy, degrade personal growth
or self-worth, or diminish life-management and social skills (de
Melo-Martín, 2010; Allhoff et al., 2011). These demands can
be reasonably placed upon envisioned enhancements, even if
they aren’t applied so stringently to proven medical therapies.
Improvements towards health are usually consistent with personal
empowerment, and the consequences of restoring normal func-
tioning are largely understood. By contrast, the longer term effects
of experimental enhancements, especially cognitive performance
enhancements, on the psychological self and internal self-
conceptions and motivations are among the least predictable and
understood aspects of this issue. Ethics is rightly concerned about
the vital capacities for autonomy, dignity, and morality. All the
same, as we have noted, setting high standards for cognitive per-
formance enhancing interventions need not cast dark suspicions
upon the persistent search for, and studies of enhancements.
A number of scholars have advocated for practical and ethical
standards while endorsing the pursuit of enhancement (including
Buchanan, 2011; Glannon, 2011; Giordano, 2012; Heinrichs,
2012; Clark, 2014; Maslen et al., 2014a). In short, the goal is to
develop helpful interventions able to meet these high standards.
If such normative thresholds are maintained, public and
regulatory approval could be a helpfully expedited matter. But
approval may not be automatic. Labeling an intervention as
an “enhancement” once it makes individual lives demonstrably
better can’t be the final hurdle before regulatory approval (Gior-
dano and DuRousseau, 2011). One further—and arguably major
factor—that cannot be omitted is the wider public context. We
believe that this is where the broadest and deepest deliberations
over the wisdom of enhancement should occur. We are forced to
ponder what shall be done when sound public priorities cannot
automatically approve genuinely ethical enhancements.
Policy principles should be well informed, ethical, and just.
When some reliable enhancements are deemed safe and effective,
and seem capable of promoting the good life, why wouldn’t they
be approved through policy and law? Here, it is important to
appreciate that sincere advocacy of genuine individual enhancers
could still be under-informed, potentially unethical, and possi-
bly unjust. In those cases, public wisdom should lean against
approval.
In this regard, two issues must remain distinct: First, it must be
asked, and determined, if an intervention is a genuine enhancer.
Second, if it is, then it must be asked if this enhancer is something
that sound policy can approve and sanction. The criteria by which
an enhancement is deemed conducive for the “good life” cannot
be the same criteria that are used to determine whether to approve
it. In the open space of public deliberation, it must be possible that
sound policy can proscribe or prevent something that is presently
understood to be reliably conducive to the “good life”.
Here we avoid assumptions that knowing what is conducive
to the good life for each person constitutes knowing what is
ethical and wise. We also avoid the position that knowledge about
what is conducive to the “good life” for everyone constitutes
knowing what is ethical and wise. Rather, we posit an alternative
stance. We argue that (1) well-informed policy would use more
information than just the scientific facts about a performance
enhancer promoting the “good life”; (2) ethical policy would use
other ethical criteria beside simple promotion of the “good life”
(individually or collectively); and (3) just policy may prefer a
stable and well-ordered society that isn’t advancing the individual
or collective “good life” quite as fast as could be technologically
possible (or imagined by technophiles).
Gazing upon the stance we propose, eager advocates of
enhancement might ask why objective scientific facts couldn’t or
shouldn’t lead the way, especially when cognitive performance
enhancement seems so modest, practical, and generically useful?
In doing so, they appear to endorse the general ethical guideline
that:
A sound policy decision will always approve what, in light of ascer-
tainable scientific facts, can be expected to be an enhancement to
an individual that is conducive to what “our society” regards as the
“good life.”
This guideline does not represent our position; we deem it
unwise and replete with confusions, and when it appears to be
doing the real work behind hasty encouragements of cognitive
performance enhancement, we deplore it. Whether this is the
actual view of any bioethicist or neuroethicist, or just a caricature
for academic target practice, we cannot really say, because few
scholars have explicated their meta-ethical presumptions. We do
assert, however, that this stance is inadequate to meet the urgent
complexities and contextualities inherent to authentic human life
as we all must actually live it. In fact, there is little that is genuinely
neuroethical in it. Our call for a neuroethics that takes context
seriously, especially where cognitive performance enhancement is
the issue, isn’t merely fodder for academic debate.
Sarewitz and Karas (2012) outline several different approaches
that can be adopted in order to make choices and decisions about
cognitive enhancing technologies. Among those, our view aligns
with the “optimistic” approach, via engagement of a managed
technological optimism that best represents our position as rel-
evant to ethical decision-making processes and public policies
in this field. We endorse continued research into cognitive per-
formance enhancements. We also call for the need to optimize
definitions of any/all concepts and terms, and to equally define
the contexts in which any cognitive task optimization can/would
occur. Only from that point can one be optimistic that a pro-
gressive, non-static concept of the human and human function
will be realistically entertained and enhanced, both practically and
ethically. This position takes a pluralistic, democratic approach
towards options of emergent (rather than merely proscriptive)
governance, and the final section of this essay points to ways that
neuroethics can play a supportive role.
We posit that a contextualized neuroethical outlook allows
for better-informed approaches, utilizing all relevant interdisci-
plinary input, for considering what therapies and enhancements
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could be. It permits neuroethical deliberation to rise above local
conventionality and a single social ethos, to instead survey the
rich cultural diversity of human self-understandings and dynamic
cognitive capacities. And, it encourages neuroethics to render
verdicts against destabilizing and unjust procedures in policy
debates that rashly extend medical models beyond their proper
functioning.
This neuroethics isn’t proscriptive, nor does it seek to
uniformly obstruct enhancement. In its naturalistic basis, it estab-
lishes grounds to view the human as engaging biology (through
intellectual and physical tools) to optimize survival and flour-
ishing in changing ecologies. And in its appreciation for the
human as a bio-psychosocial organism it engenders an inter-
disciplinary approach (conjoining anthropology, sociology, eco-
nomics, and political science) to depict and address ethical issues
within the contexts in which human activities are conducted.
Thus, in the spirit of cognitive enhancement itself, neuroethics
as a discipline—and in its methods, approaches, and practices—
should embody and enable greater human self-understanding,
and improve our public deliberations over the many dimensions
of life that we treasure.
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